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INSURANCE COVERAGE OF ENVIRONMENTAL
LIABILITY IN MONTANA
Mark Shelton F. Williams*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act' (CERCLA) or "Superfund" is creating extensive
litigation across the country in the area of environmental liability.
Federal and state governments, as well as private property owners,
are actively employing CERCLA provisions to compel cleanup of
contaminated property and to recover costs for completed cleanup
actions. CERCLA is likely to be a major source of future litigation.
For entities designated as Potentially Responsible Parties2 (PRPs)
under CERCLA, insurance coverage of cleanup expenses and de-
fense costs is of paramount concern, and will surely create addi-
tional litigation between insurers and insureds.
Insurance companies have attempted to limit their exposure to
pollution liability through pollution exclusion clauses. While volu-
minous (and often contradictory) case law on pollution coverage
issues exists nationally, particularly on the interpretation of the
pollution exclusion clauses,' the Montana Supreme Court has yet
to address the major issues. "At stake to insurers and insureds are
tens, if not hundreds of billions of dollars."' Montana courts and
attorneys should prepare to address these issues in the near future.
* B.A. Middlebury College, 1987; J.D. University of Montana, 1992. Judicial clerk for
The Honorable Paul J. Kelly, Jr., United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. I
would like to thank my Environmental Law classmates Vic Bottomly, Tom Glynn, Ed
Hayes, Larry Howell, Cindy Jones, and Professor John Horwich for providing CERCLA re-
search and editing assistance. I also thank my Insurance Law-Independent Study advisor,
Professor Greg Munro, for guidance in preparing the article. Any errors that remain are
mine.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988 & Supp. II 1991). The author hereafter refers to the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act interchangeably
as CERCLA, "Superfund," or "the Act."
2. 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1988).
3. Courts in different states, and at times even in the same state, have been una-
ble to reach a consensus on a seemingly straightforward issue: Whether the stan-
dard liability insurance policies issued to countless insureds over the past forty-
five years can cover the cost of compliance with government-mandated cleanup of
environmental contamination. At stake to insurers and insureds are tens, if not
hundreds, of billions of dollars .... Indeed, the sheer magnitude of this and other
issues has turned insurance coverage litigation from a legal backwater into one of
the more exciting legal specialties of the late 1980s and early 1990s.
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II. OVERVIEW OF CERCLA
Congress enacted CERCLA "to provide a comprehensive re-
sponse to the problem of hazardous substance release." 5 The Act
allows the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to initiate
cleanup procedures at contaminated sites.6 It also permits the EPA
to seek injunctions to abate threats to public health or welfare
from releases of hazardous substances.7 Finally, the Act gives pri-
vate parties a cause of action against parties responsible for an en-
vironmental hazard.8 CERCLA's liability provisions are a key fea-
ture of the Act, because they allow the government or private
parties to recover cleanup costs from responsible parties.9
CERCLA's liability scheme is harsh; liability is strict, joint
and several, and applies to virtually all current and former owners
or operators of facilities'" where there has been a release" or a
threatened release of a hazardous substance' 2 into the environ-
ment. 3 Courts have interpreted CERCLA's liability scheme
broadly, finding individual officers and directors, sole shareholders,
parent corporations and successor corporations liable, without ad-
herence to common law standards of corporate limited liability.14
The insurer of a liable party cannot be sued directly under CER-
CLA, although at least one plaintiff has attempted to do so.'5
5. Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 890 (9th Cir. 1986).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1988).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (1988).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988). Responsible parties include all current and former owners
or operators of the facility without regard to fault, unless the contamination was caused by
an act of God, act of war, or act of a third party not in a contractual relationship with the
defendant. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)-(b) (1988).
10. The term "facility" means:
(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline ... well, pit,
pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, roll-
ing stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a hazardous substance has been
deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located; but does
not include any consumer product in consumer use or any vessel.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (1988).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (1988) (defining release).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988) (defining "hazardous substance").
13. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). See generally Lewis M. Barr, CERCLA Made Simple:
An Analysis of the Cases Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion and Liability Act of 1980, 45 Bus. LAW. 923 (1990) (comprehensive overview of CER-
CLA liability).
14. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985);
United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 893-97 (E.D.N.C. 1985); United States v. Kayser-
Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15, 22 (D.R.I. 1989), aff'd, 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 957 (1991).
15. Port Allen Marine Services, Inc. v. Chotin, 765 F. Supp. 887 (M.D. La. 1991). The
court held that the insurer of an owner or operator cannot be sued directly because the
2
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CERCLA is aimed at cleaning up hazardous substances, '
which are defined as any substance designated as hazardous in the
Federal Water Pollution, Prevention, and Control Act,1 7 CERCLA
itself, 8 and other specified statutes. 9 The government need not
show any threshold level of a hazardous substance to require
action.2 0
CERCLA authorizes the EPA "to remove or arrange for the
removal of, and provide for remedial action relating to such haz-
ardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant at any time . . . to
protect the public health or welfare or the environment. '' 21 Al-
though the EPA may compel a private party to institute cleanup
action,2 2 the EPA may use Superfund money only for sites listed
on the National Priority List.23 Alternatively, private parties may
conduct cleanups on their own and recover the costs from other
responsible parties, provided that the cleanup action "results in a
CERCLA-quality cleanup."'"
After Congress enacted CERCLA, Montana adopted corre-
sponding legislation providing for cooperative cleanup actions with
the federal government. 25 The Montana Act (or "mini-superfund")
provides for independent state actions, and contains a liability pro-
vision similar to CERCLA's which holds virtually all current and
prior owners jointly and severally liable for contamination. 26 The
Montana Supreme Court has yet to address these provisions.
III. INSURANCE COVERAGE ISSUES
Government agencies and private parties seeking to fund
cleanup actions pursue the current and former owners and opera-
tors of the property for the cleanup costs. 2 7 The owners and opera-
tors then turn to their insurance companies for indemnification
and defense. The insurance industry has attempted to limit cover-
age of environmental liability through restrictions in the compre-
insurer is not listed as a responsible party under section 9607(a) of CERCLA. Id. at 888-89.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1988).
17. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(2)(A) (1988).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 9602 (1988).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988).
20. United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 185 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1988).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1988); 40 C.F.R. § 300.700 (1992).
23. 40 C.F.R. § 300.425(b)(1) (1992). The National Priority List is compiled by the
EPA pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1988) and is found at 40 C.F.R. § 300 app. B.
24. 40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c)(3)(i) (1991).
25. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 75-10-601 to -628 (1991).
26. MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-10-715 (1991).
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
1993]
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hensive general liability (CGL) policy. The industry first imple-
mented the "standard" pollution exclusion clause in 1973, and
then switched to the more restrictive "absolute" pollution exclu-
sion clause in 1986.28 Pollution coverage claims often involve insur-
ance policies dating back several decades because CERCLA liabil-
ity applies retroactively. Although the polluting activities could
have occurred many years ago, the pollution may have been discov-
ered only recently.29 Litigation of pollution exclusion provisions
has raised both interpretation issues and public policy questions.30
A. History of the Pollution Exclusion
1. The Comprehensive General Liability Policy
Most CGL policies look identical and are based on insurance
industry forms."1 Current CGL policies often provide that the in-
surer will indemnify the insured for losses (defined as "occur-
rences") but exclude coverage for losses related to pollution.32
Prior to 1973, standard form CGL policies did not contain a pollu-
tion exclusion. Until 1966, the insurance industry based coverage
on the happening of an "accident," defined as "a distinctive event
28. Erwin E. Adler & Steven A. Boiles, The Pollution Exclusion: Implementing the
Social Policy of Preventing Pollution Through the Insurance Policy, 19 Lov. L.A. L. REV.
1251, 1255 (1986).
29. According to one study of pollution liability insurance claims, "the average claim
was not closed until seven years after the end of the policy period and ... almost 25 percent
were not closed for 12 years." Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Lim-
its of Insurance, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 942, 965 n.71 (1988) (citing U.S. General Accounting
Office, Hazardous Waste: Issues Surrounding Insurance Availability 79-80 (1987)).
30. Congress intended CERCLA to place the burden of cleanup costs on those parties
responsible for the pollution, or at least on those parties having benefitted from the prop-
erty and in the best position to have prevented the damage. Dedham Water Co. v. Cumber-
land Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir. 1986); Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F.
Supp. 665, 671 (D. Idaho 1986). Arguably, insurance companies issuing CGL policies did not
contract to compensate businesses for normal operating expenses, only for accidental or cat-
astrophic losses. If Congress's intent is to place an affirmative duty upon property owners to
remedy existing pollution and avoid future pollution, then it is appropriate that property
owners, and not their insurers, bear the burden of cleanup. See generally Erwin E. Adler &
Steven A. Broiles, The Pollution Exclusion: Implementing the Social Policy of Preventing
Pollution Through the Insurance Policy, 19 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1251 (1986).
31. Most common insurance policies are standardized, and drafted by insurance indus-
try organizations. See ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 2.8 (1988). See
also George Pendygraft et al., Who Pays for Environmental Damage: Recent Developments
in CERCLA Liability and Insurance Coverage Litigation, 21 IND. L. REV. 117, 140 (1988)
[hereinafter Pendygraft et al.].
32. See Abraham, supra note 29, at 951. The current CGL policy is discussed more
fully in section III of this article.
33. Robert M. Tyler, Jr. & Todd J: Wilcox, Pollution Exclusion Clauses: Problems in
Interpretation and Application Under the Comprehensive General Liability Policy, 17
IDAHO L. REV. 497, 499-500 (1981).
4
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that takes place by some unexpected happening at a date that can
be fixed with reasonable certainty."3 In 1966, the insurance indus-
try changed the term "accident" to "occurrence," which the indus-
try's CGL policies define as "an accident, including continuous or
repeated exposure to conditions, which results in bodily injury or
property damage neither expected nor intended by the insured." '
Courts have generally found coverage for pollution liability under
these policies, by finding that the pollution was neither "expected
nor intended" by the insured. 6
The Montana Supreme Court has held that the "occurrence"
policy excludes coverage of property damage which is expected or
intended by the insured. 7 The court has interpreted the clause to
"preclude[ ] coverage for . . . damages, though not specifically in-
tended by the insured, if the resulting harm was within the expec-
tation or intention of the insured from his standpoint. '' 38 Under
this interpretation, the court must consider whether pollution,
which is the byproduct of intentional activities such as manufac-
turing, is "expected" by the insured. Under this subjective stan-
dard, the insured's prior knowledge and conduct enters into the
factual question of intent. 3
2. The "Standard" Pollution Exclusion
In 1973 the insurance industry added a pollution exclusion
clause to the CGL policy, now referring to it as the "standard"
pollution exclusion. This clause excludes "expected or intended"
releases but not "sudden and accidental" releases.' ° Courts inter-
34. Id. at 499.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 500. See, e.g., Steyer v. Westvaco Corp., 450 F. Supp. 384, 391 (D. Md.
1978).
37. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Rae Volunteer Fire Co., 212 Mont. 450, 455,
688 P.2d 1246, 1249 (1984) (holding that the insured fire company's decision to allow a fire
to burn was intentional, and the resulting property damage was expected and therefore not
an "occurrence").
38. Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v. Phalen, 182 Mont. 448, 459, 597 P.2d 720, 726
(1979). See also New Hampshire Ins. Group v. Strecker, 244 Mont. 478, 480, 798 P.2d 130,
131 (1990) (where the court denied coverage for liability resulting from the insured's sexual
molestation, because the act (not the damage) was intentional).
39. For example, where an insured knew of the deaths of waterfowl at the polluted
site, the jury found that the insured "expected and intended" the pollution, thus precluding
insurance coverage. Shell Oil Co. v. Accident & Casualty Ins. Co. of Witherton, No. 278953,
slip op. (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Oct. 6, 1988). See Nicholas J. Wallwork et al., Liability
Insurance in Environmental Litigation: An Overview of Selected Issues in Developing Ari-
zona Law, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 367, 379 (1990) [hereinafter Wallwork et al.].
40. [T]his policy does not apply ... to bodily injury or property damage arising
out of the discharge, dispersal, release, or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes,
1993l
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preting this provision are split on whether the CGL policy covers
pollution-related damages in spite of the exclusion."' At least
twelve state courts have addressed the issue. Colorado, 2 Florida,"
Georgia,44 Illinois,45 and Wisconsin4 6 have ruled in favor of cover-
age for the insured, while Alabama, 7 Iowa," Massachusetts, 9
Michigan,5" New York,5 1 North Carolina, 52 and Ohios3 have upheld
the exclusion. Numerous federal decisions also have interpreted
state law.5 4 Litigation surrounding the exclusion usually focuses on
two issues: (1) whether the event was "expected or intended" (and
does "expected or intended" apply to the activity or to the result-
ing damage?); 5 or (2) whether the event was "sudden and acciden-
tal" (e.g., a major spill in the course of one day versus a slow un-
derground leak over several years).5 Insurers argue that "expected
or intended" excludes coverage for pollution from intentional ac-
tivities such as manufacturing, and that "sudden and accidental"
bars coverage in cases where the pollution took place over a long
acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste material or other irritants,
contaminants or pollutants into or upon the land, the atmosphere or any water-
course or body of water; but this exclusion shall not apply if such discharge, dis-
persal, release or escape is sudden and accidental.
William B. Johnson, Annotation, Construction and Application of Pollution Exclusion
Clause in Liability Insurance Policy, 39 AL.R.4TH 1047, 1049 n.1 (1985).
41. Pendygraft et al., supra note 31, at 152. See generally, Stacy Gordon, Pollution
Exclusion Confusion, Bus. INs., April 6, 1992, at 1. As one commentator points out, there is
no clear majority position, and proponents of both sides claim majority support. Goodwin,
supra note 3, at 791-92 n.71.
42. Hecla Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083, 1092 (Colo. 1991).
43. Dimmitt Chevrolet, Inc. v. Southeastern Fidelity Ins. Corp., No. 78-293, 1992
LEXIS 1599 (Fla. 1992).
44. Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 380 S.E.2d 686, 688 (Ga. 1989).
45. United States Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Wilkin Insulation Co., 578 N.E.2d 926, 933
(Ill. 1991).
46. Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 456 N.W.2d 570, 578-79 (Wis. 1990).
47. Hicks v. American Resources Ins. Co., 544 So. 2d 952, 954 (Ala. 1989).
48. Weber v. IMT Ins. Co., 462 N.W.2d 283 (Iowa 1990).
49. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co. v. Belleville Indus., Inc., 555 N.E.2d 568, 575
(Mass. 1990).
50. Upjohn Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 476 N.W.2d 392, 402 (Mich. 1991).
51. Powers Chemco, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 548 N.E.2d 1301, 1302 (N.Y. 1989).
52. Waste Mgmt. of Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 340 S.E.2d 374, 383 (N.C.
1986).
53. Hybud Equip. Corp. v. Sphere Drake Ins. Co., 597 N.E.2d 1096, 1104 (Ohio 1992).
54. This has created additional confusion. In two recent decisions, the First and
Fourth Circuits reached opposite results in interpreting the pollution exclusion under New
Jersey law. See CPC Int'l v. Northbrook Excess & Surplus Ins. Co., 962 F.2d 77 (1st Cir.
1992); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Triangle Indus. Inc., 957 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1992).
55. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Waltham Indus. Lab. Corp., 883 F.2d 1092, 1098-99 (1st
Cir. 1989).
56. See Hybud, 597 N.E.2d at 1104.
6
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period of time." Insureds argue either that the exclusion is ambig-
uous for failing to define "sudden and accidental," or that the ex-
clusion bars coverage only if the resulting damage was actually "in-
tended" by an "active" polluter.58
a. Interpretation of "Sudden and Accidental"
Courts upholding the CGL exclusion clause find no ambiguity
in the phrase "sudden and accidental" and find that "sudden" has
a temporal aspect which differs from "accidental" or "unex-
pected. ' 59 "For the word 'sudden' to have any significant purpose,
and not to be surplusage when used generally in conjunction with
the word 'accidental,' it must have a temporal aspect to its mean-
ing, and not merely a sense of something unexpected." 0 These
courts also hold that the "language is clear and plain, something
only a lawyer's ingenuity could make ambiguous."61 Some courts
and commentators perceive that the current trend is toward find-
ing the exclusion unambiguous. "The emerging majority, view .is to
accept the pollution exclusion as given, and to determine whether
the facts of each case evidence a sudden discharge. 6 2 The focus,
then, is on the timeframe of the pollution, rather than the intent of
57. - Goodwin, supra note 3, at 791. For example, the exclusion would provide coverage
for a "sudden and accidental" event where the pollution was caused by vandals opening an
oil storage tank. See Compass Ins. Co. v. Cravens, Dargan & Co., 748 P.2d 724, 726, 730
(Wyo. 1988).
58. See, e.g., Jackson Township v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 451 A.2d 990, 994
(N.J. Super. 1982) (finding coverage for the unintended results of intentional acts). See also
Goodwin, supra note 3, at 791; Pendygraft et al., supra note 31, at 152. An example of
intentional pollution is a county landfill. See County of Broome v. Aetna Casualty & Sur.
Co., 540 N.Y.S.2d 620, 623 (1989).
59. Hybud, 597 N.E.2d at 1102. See also Upjohn Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 476
N.W.2d 392, 397 (Mich. 1991); Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co. v. Belleville Ind., Inc., 555
N.E.2d 568, 572 (Mass. 1990).
60. Hybud, 597 N.E.2d at 1102 (citations omitted).
61. Id. (citing United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Star Fire Coals, Inc., 856 F.2d 31,
34 (6th Cir. 1988)).
62. See Robert M. Chemers & Robert J. Franco, The Contemporary View of the Pol-
lution Exclusion-A Provincial Approach, in SELECTED ISSUES IN INSURANCE COVERAGE AND
PRACTICE 103 (Defense Research Institute ed. 1990) (citing International Minerals & Chem.
Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 522 N.E.2d 758, 766 (Ill. App. 1988)). New York authority
now recognizes:
[A]n emerging nationwide judicial consensus that the pollution exclusion is unam-
biguous and that an insured who was accused of causing injury or property dam-
age by the intentional discharge of pollutants over an extended period of time is
bound by the terms of the exclusion and is not entitled to be defended or indem-
nified by his insurer.
Id. at 100 (citing Colonie Motors, Inc. v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 538 N.E.2d 630,
635 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989)).
7
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the polluter.6 3 "The 'sudden and accidental' language, unlike the
'occurrence' definition, does not by its terms take account of an
insured's status as a passive polluter. 6 4 Under this reasoning, the
proper inquiry is whether the discharge was sudden, not whether
the insured anticipated or expected the discharge. a5 If the pollu-
tion occurred regularly over several years, coverage is denied. 6
Furthermore, some courts place the burden on the insured to show
that the occurrence comes within the sudden and accidental
exception.6
When finding for the insured, however, courts interpret "sud-
den and accidental" as being ambiguous, reasoning that (1) sudden
could mean either abrupt, immediate, or unexpected and unin-
tended," and (2) the "extreme divergence among the numerous ju-
risdictions considering this issue" suggests ambiguity.6 9 By one
count, "over fifty cases have found the term 'sudden and acciden-
tal' ambiguous and over fifty cases have found the term clear and
unambiguous. ' 70 These courts, therefore, interpret the provision in
favor of the insureds7 ' and focus solely on the intent of the in-
sured, rather than on the timeframe of the pollution.72
b. Interpretation of "Expected or Intended"
Courts that find the "sudden and accidental" term ambiguous
focus on the intent of the insured in determining coverage. Colo-
rado and Illinois have held that "intended" means the intent to
pollute, and that the intent to manufacture or mine does not con-
63. See A. Johnson & Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 933 F.2d 66, 73 (1st Cir. 1991)
(applying Maine law); Powers Chemco, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 548 N.E.2d 1301, 1302 (N.Y.
1989).
64. A. Johnson, 933 F.2d at 72 n.9 (citations omitted).
65. Chemers & Franco, supra note 62, at 101.
66. See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Waltham Indus. Lab. Corp., 883 F.2d 1092, 1098-99
(1st Cir. 1989).
67. See, e.g., Covenant Ins. Co. v. Friday Eng'g, Inc., 742 F. Supp. 708, 711 (D. Mass.
1990).
68. Hecla Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083, 1092 (Colo. 1991);
Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 380 S.E.2d 686, 688 (Ga. 1989); Just v. Land Recla-
mation, Ltd., 456 N.W.2d 570, 573 (Wis. 1990).
69. Dimmitt Chevrolet, Inc. v. Southeastern Fidelity Ins. Corp., No. 78-293, 1992
LEXIS 1599, at '13. See also Hecla, 811 P.2d at 1091; Claussen, 380 S.E.2d at 688; Just,
456 N.W.2d at 573.
70. Dimmitt, 1992 LEXIS 1599, at *10.
71. But see Weber v. IMT Ins. Co., 462 N.W.2d 283, 287 (Iowa 1990) (in Iowa, manure
regularly spilled on the road by a pig farmer was expected, and therefore not accidental,
regardless of whether it was pollution).
72. Dimmitt, 1992 LEXIS 1599, at *21.
[Vol. 54
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stitute the intent to pollute.73 "Recovery will be barred only if the
insured intended the damages, or . . . knew that the damages
would flow directly and immediately from its intentional act .... ,74
Other courts considering the "intent" issue have denied cover-
age to industrial polluters by focusing on "active" versus "passive"
polluters, and awarding indemnification only for "passive" (or un-
intentional) polluters.75 "Active" pollution is the byproduct of an
ongoing, intentional activity, such as manufacturing. 7 "Passive"
pollution is unknown, unintended, and often the result of under-
ground tank leakage." Applemans' Insurance Law and Practice
defines intent as follows: "The word 'intent' for purposes of tort
law and for purposes of exclusionary clauses in insurance policies
denotes that the actor desires to cause the consequences of his act
or believes that consequences are substantially certain to result
from it."'"
s
c. Insurance Contract Interpretation in Montana
Insurance contracts are subject to the general rules of contract
law, and are strictly construed against the insurer and in favor of
the insured.7 9 Montana follows the general rule that ambiguous
policy exclusions are construed against the insurer. 80 "A clause is
ambiguous when different persons looking at it in the light of its
purpose cannot agree upon its meaning."81 Unambiguous insurance
provisions, however, are construed according to the plain and ordi-
nary meaning of the terms.8 2 If the language is unambiguous,
73. Hecla, 811 P.2d at 1088; United States Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Wilkin Insulation
Co., 578 N.E.2d 926, 932 (Ill. 1991). See also Jackson Township Mun. Utilities Auth. v.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 451 A.2d 990, 993-95 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982)
(finding coverage for the unintended results of intentional acts).
74. Hecla, 811 P.2d at 1088 (citing City of Johnstown v. Bankers Standard Ins. Co.,
877 F.2d 1146, 1150 (2d Cir. 1989)).
75. See Chemers & Franco, supra note 62, at 100. See, e.g., Grant-S. Iron & Metal Co.
v. CNA Ins. Co., 905 F.2d 954, 957 (6th Cir. 1990) (applying Michigan law); Hicks v. Ameri-
can Resources Ins. Co., 544 So. 2d 952, 954 (Ala. 1989).
76. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Waltham Indus. Lab. Corp., 883 F.2d 1092, 1098-99 (1st Cir.
1989) (applying Massachusetts law).
77. See United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Van's Westlake Union, Inc., 664 P.2d 1262, 1266
(Wash. App. 1983).
78. JOHN A. APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4492.02 (rev.
ed. 1981).
79. Id. §§ 7401, 7405.
80. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Cameron, 194 Mont. 219, 221, 633 P.2d 1212, 1214 (1981).
81. Bauer Ranch v. Mountain W. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 215 Mont. 153, 156, 695
P.2d 1307, 1309 (1985).
82. Johnson v. Equitable Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 142 Mont. 128, 131, 381 P.2d 778,
779 (1963).
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"there is no basis for the interpretation of coverage under the guise
of ambiguity.""3 Although these maxims of interpretation will be
important when the Montana Supreme Court addresses the pollu-
tion exclusion issue, public policy considerations (discussed in Sec-
tion V) may also be a significant factor due to the substantial split
in authority nationally.
3. The "Absolute" Pollution Exclusion
In 1986 the insurance industry revised the pollution exclusion,
attempting to make it iron-clad. The current standard form CGL
policy contains an "absolute" pollution exclusion which excludes
coverage for:
(1) "Bodily injury" or "property damage" arising out of the ac-
tual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, release or escape
of pollutants:
(a) At or from premises you own, rent or occupy;
(2) Any loss, cost, or expense arising out of any governmental di-
rection or request that you test for, monitor, clean up, remove,
contain, treat, detoxify or neutralize pollutants.84
The policy defines "pollutants" as any "solid, liquid, gaseous ...
contaminant, including . . . chemicals and waste."85 The exclusion
is "absolute" because it no longer provides coverage, even for sud-
den and accidental discharges. The insurance industry apparently
grew tired of the judicial contract drafting that occurred under the
standard exclusion.
The First, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have found "absolute"
exclusion clauses to be unambiguous. 8 In Titan Holdings Syndi-
cate, Inc. v. City of Keene, the insured city argued that the provi-
sion was vague and could be applied broadly to include coverage
for almost any type of damages related to the city's sewage treat-
ment plant. The First Circuit upheld the provision as unambigu-
83. Erickson v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 241 Mont. 119, 123, 785 P.2d 705, 707-08 (1990)
(citing Bauer Ranch, 215 Mont. at 156, 695 P.2d at 1309). Montana courts, when construing
insurance contracts, "are not authorized to seize upon certain and definite covenants ex-
pressed in plain English with violent hands, and distort them so as to include a risk clearly
excluded by the insurance contract." Johnson, 142 Mont. at 131, 381 P.2d at 779.
84. See Titan Holdings Syndicate, Inc. v. City of Keene, 898 F.2d 265, 267 n.2 (1st Cir.
1990).
85. See id. 898 F.2d at 267-68.
86. Id. 898 F.2d at 265 (applying New Hampshire law, specifically addressing the defi-
nition of "pollutants"); Park-Ohio Indus., Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 975 F.2d 1215 (6th Cir.
1992) (applying Ohio law); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Kent Corp., 896 F.2d 501 (11th Cir.) vacated
as moot, 909 F.2d 424 (11th Cir. 1990) (applying Alabama law).
[Vol. 54
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ous, noting that a dispute over the scope of coverage does not
mean the policy is ambiguous." In Reliance Insurance Co. v. Kent
Corp., fire fighters who were injured during a dumpster fire sued
the insured corporation.8 The fire fighters alleged that the fire in-
volved hazardous chemicals. 9 The insurance carrier denied cover-
age because the claim was based on a polluting event.90 The Elev-
enth Circuit held that if it were proven that hazardous chemicals
caused the fire fighters' injuries, the pollution exclusion would pre-
clude coverage.91 In Park-Ohio Industries, Inc. v. Home Indemnity
Co., the insured corporation was sued by its customers' employees
who were injured by pollution from the defective furnaces.9 2 The
insured corporation argued for coverage in spite of the exclusion,
because the damages were caused by a defective product.93 The
Sixth Circuit denied coverage, reasoning that the exclusion pre-
cluded coverage for any damages caused by a discharge of
pollution."
Judging from these initial circuit court decisions, it appears
that the insurance industry has successfully created an iron-clad
exclusion. The courts' broad acceptance and application of the pro-
vision suggests that the absolute pollution exclusion will have a
significant effect on future commercial insurance coverage. The
provision might preclude coverage of any damages related to chem-
icals, petroleum products, or any of the other innumerable "pollu-
tants" related to manufacturing and production, or arising from an
industrial accident. Some courts and commentators, however, have
found coverage even under the absolute exclusion for unexpected
pollution damages.9 5 At least one state appellate court has found
coverage under the absolute exclusion based on a "passive pol-
luter" analysis.9 6 That court, however, mistakenly relied on author-
ity which discussed the standard pollution exclusion, not the abso-
lute exclusion.97
87. Titan Holdings, 898 F.2d at 269.
88. Reliance, 896 F.2d at 502.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 503.
92. Park-Ohio Indus., 975 F.2d at 1217.
93. Id. at 1223.
94. Id.
95. Abraham, supra note 29, at 951 n.29.
96. Thompson v. Temple, 580 So. 2d 1133 (La. 1991).
97. Id. at 1134. The Louisiana appellate court cites John A. Appleman, INSURANCE
LAW AND PRACTICE § 4499.05 (Supp. 1992), for the proposition that the pollution exclusion
clause is "intended to exclude coverage for active industrial polluters." Thompson, 580 So.
2d at 1134. That section of Appleman, however, specifically addresses the sudden and acci-
1993]
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B. Cleanup Costs as "Damages" and the "Owned Property"
Exclusion
Insurance carriers often argue, and a few courts have accepted,
that environmental cleanup costs are not "damages" and therefore
are not covered by the CGL policy. The policy provides coverage
for "sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay
as damages because of ... property damage.""8 The minority rea-
soning is that the CGL policy covers only legal damages and not
equitable relief,99 while CERCLA actions against landowners are in
the form of equitable relief and therefore are not covered. An in-
creasing number of jurisdictions, 100 however, hold otherwise, as
more courts liberally construe "damages" to include cleanup costs,
based on the reasonable expectations of the insured. 1'0 State and
federal court decisions from Idaho, 02 Washington,0 3 California,'
and Oregon' 05 interpret "damages" to include cleanup costs.
Insurance carriers further argue that the CGL policy excludes
coverage for pollution damages to the insured's own property. The
CGL policy usually excludes "damages to 'property owned or occu-
pied by . . . the insured,'" and the policy only provides coverage
for sums that the insured "shall become legally obligated to pay as
damages" to a third party. 06 Although these provisions appear to
deny coverage for cleanup instituted by the insureds on their own
property, courts often do award coverage for these cleanup costs
because cleanup is required by the government. 07 A few courts
dental exception to the standard pollution exclusion, and is irrelevant to the absolute exclu-
sion. The Louisiana court then proceeds to speculate that "[iut is unlikely that the insurance
industry intended such an exclusion clause to apply to [carbon monoxide leaking from a
heater in a home]." Id. at 1135.
98. Goodwin, supra note 3, at 788-89 (citing Underlying Coverage,.1 THE ArORNEY'S
UMBRELLA BOOK 79 (P. Ligeros rev. ed. 1986)) (emphasis in original).
99. See Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348, 1352-54 (4th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1008 (1988) (applying Maryland law).
100. See Chesapeake Utilities Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 704 F. Supp.
551, 560 (D. Del. 1989); Carol A. Crocca, Annotation, Liability Insurance Coverage for Vio-
lations of Antipollution Laws, 87 A.L.R4TH 444, 459-62 (1991).
101. See Avondale Indus., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 887 F.2d 1200, 1207 (2d Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 906 (1990) (applying New York law).
102. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Pintlar Corp., 948 F.2d 1507, 1515 (9th Cir. 1991)
(applying Idaho law).
103. Boeing Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 784 P.2d 507, 516 (Wash. 1990).
104. Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 692 F. Supp. 1171, 1193-94 (N.D.
Cal. 1988).
105. Port of Portland v. Water Quality Ins. Syndicate, 796 F.2d 1188, 1194 (9th Cir.
1986) (applying Oregon law).
106. Abraham, supra note 29, at 966.
107. See Intel Corp., 692 F. Supp. at 1192.
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have strictly upheld this exclusion'"8 while others have broadly in-
terpreted "owned" property to extend coverage. 1 9
C. The Pollution as a "Product"
Some insureds have argued that the exclusion does not apply
because the contaminant in question is a "product" and not actu-
ally "pollution."110 For example, one court held that whether paint
is a pollutant for purposes of the exclusion is a question of fact.1
The Sixth Circuit, however, held in Park-Ohio Industries that
the pollution exclusion applies where the pollution is created by a
"product" in a product liability case.1 2 This litigation stemmed
from personal injuries caused by polluting furnaces manufactured
by the insured corporation. 13 The corporation argued that the ex-
clusion was inapplicable because the loss resulted from a defective
product, not a pollution discharge." 4 Applying Ohio law, the court
held that the absolute pollution exclusion in plaintiff's policy ap-
plied to any discharge of pollutants, and refused to "inject a defect
versus discharge distinction into the pollution exclusion. 11115
D. Interpreting the Time of the "Occurrence"
Most CGL policies since 1966 provide that the carrier is obli-
gated to pay for damage caused by an "occurrence" during the pol-
icy period. Nevertheless, claims may be filed after the policy pe-
riod.1 Pollution often takes place over several years, or decades;
during this time several different companies may have insured the
property owner or operator. The question becomes one of defining
what event triggers coverage which, in turn, determines the appli-
cable policies. 7 Some courts hold that the "occurrence" provision
triggers coverage at the time of discovery, or when the damage
manifests itself. These courts usually determine that the most re-
108. Abraham, supra note 29, at 966 (citing Great Lakes Container Corp. v. National
Union Fire Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 30, 33-34 (1st Cir. 1984) and other cases as examples).
109. Id. (citing United States Aviex Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 336 N.W.2d 838, 843
(Mich. App. 1983)).
110. See, e.g., A-1 Sandblasting & Steamcleaning Co. v. Baiden, 643 P.2d 1260, 1262
(Or. 1982).
111. Id.
112. Park-Ohio Indus., Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 975 F.2d 1215, 1223 (6th Cir. 1992).
113. Id. at 1217.
114. Id. at 1223.
115. Id. See also Weber v. IMT Ins. Co., 462 N.W.2d 283, 287 (Iowa 1990) (finding
manure spilled on road is a pollutant).
116. See Adler and Broiles, supra note 30, at 1253.
117. See Pendygraft et al., supra note 31, at 145-47.
1993]
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cent insurance policy will provide coverage.118 Other courts hold
that coverage is triggered at the time of exposure to the damage,
such as the duration of a tank leak, " 9 or, under the "continuous
trigger" theory, that the damage is a single, continuous harm.12 0
Under the continuous trigger theory, each insurer who issued poli-
cies during the exposure period is jointly and severally liable. 2'
Courts must also consider whether the pollution results from
one occurrence or multiple occurrences. For example, soil and
groundwater pollution may be caused by a series of tank leaks over
several years. CGL policies usually provide for a maximum amount
of coverage per occurrence, with a deductible requirement for each
occurrence. If a court deems the resulting pollution to be one oc-
currence, the insured pays one deductible, and the insurer is liable
up to the single occurrence limits. If the court determines, how-
ever, that a measurable number of tank leaks existed and deems
each leak an occurrence, the insured pays several deductibles,
while the insurer is liable for policy limits on each occurrence.122
E. The Insurer's Duty to Defend
The insurer's duty to defend is slightly different in CERCLA
cases than in traditional tort cases. An insurance company's duty
to defend the insured is always separate and distinct from its duty
to reimburse the insured. The duty to defend is generally broader
than the duty to indemnify because the insurer is required to de-
fend an action in which any possibility of coverage exists."2 3 Gener-
ally, the insurer must decide whether to defend at the- outset of
litigation based on allegations in the complaint.12  The Ninth Cir-
cuit has held, however, that governmental notification of poten-
tially responsible parties ("PRP") status gives rise to this duty to
118. This is known as the "discovery" trigger. See, e.g., Mraz v. Canadian Universal
Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325, 1327-28 (4th Cir. 1986).
119. This is known as the "exposure" theory or "actual damage" approach. See, e.g.,
Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1217 (6th Cir.), aff'd
on reh'g, 657 F.2d 814 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1009 (1981); Centennial Ins.
Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 677 F. Supp. 342, 345-47 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
120. See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1042-47 (D.C.
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982); Broderick Inv. Co. v. Hartford Accident and
Indem. Co., 742 F. Supp. 571, 573 (Colo. 1989).
121. See Pendygraft et al., supra note 31, at 146.
122. See Wallwork et al., supra note 39, at 384-86.
123. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Kent Corp., 896 F.2d 501, 503 (11th Cir.), vacated as moot,
909 F.2d 424 (11th Cir. 1990).




Montana Law Review, Vol. 54 [1993], Iss. 1, Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol54/iss1/7
1993] ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY
defend in CERCLA cases even before a complaint is filed."2 5 Fol-
lowing notification, CERCLA's administrative mechanism provides
"a powerful pre-litigation procedure designed to prompt private
cleanup activities" '126 and is tantamount to a lawsuit for purposes
of duty-to-defend coverage. 127 A PRP notification letter, as op-
posed to a traditional demand letter, carries "immediate and se-
vere implications" that an "ordinary person" would consider the
"commencement of a 'suit' necessitating a legal defense. 1 28 There-
fore, the insured can reasonably expect the insurer to begin de-
fending after notification of the insured's PRP status. 29
Since the Montana Supreme Court has yet to rule on the pol-
lution exclusion, carriers faced with CERCLA cases in Montana
may agree to defend, possibly under a reservation of rights. 3 °
Some courts have held that insurers have no duty to defend when
the pollution results from a long-term, intentional activity."' Like-
wise, Montana follows the general rule that no duty to defend ex-
ists if the facts supporting the complaint show that the policy ex-
cludes coverage. 3 2 In interpreting coverage for "occurrences," the
Montana Supreme Court has found no duty to defend when the
damage was expected by the insured.1 3
125. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Pintlar Corp., 948 F.2d 1507, 1517 (9th Cir. 1991).
126. See Wallwork et al., supra note 39, at 372.
127. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 948 F.2d at 1516.
128. Id. at 1516-17.
129. At least one circuit court, however, has held otherwise. In Ray Indus. Inc. v. Lib-
erty Mut. Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 754 (6th Cir. 1992), the Sixth Circuit held that a PRP letter
does not constitute a suit which would trigger the duty to defend. "We believe that 'suit' has
a plain and unambiguous meaning that excludes the PRP letter in this case.... We reject
any attempt to allow phrases that appear in the definitions of 'suit,' such as 'legal process,'
to expand this term." Id. at 761.
130. The insurer uses a reservation of rights letter to inform the insured that the in-
surer believes potential grounds exist to deny coverage. 14 GEORGE J. COUCH ET AL.,
CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 51:88 (2d rev. ed. 1982).
131. See, e.g., International Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Anderson Dev. Co., 901 F.2d
1368, 1369 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding no duty to defend under "sudden and accidental" exclu-
sion where pollution was a byproduct of manufacturing process); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v.
SCA Services, Inc., 588 N.E.2d 1346, 1349-50 (Mass. 1992) (holding no duty to defend when
underlying suit alleges pollution as a result of a "routine business activity lasting over sev-
eral months").
132. Burns v. Underwriters Adjusting Co., 234 Mont. 508, 511, 765 P.2d 712, 713
(1988).
133. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Rae Volunteer Fire Co., 212 Mont. 450, 456,
688 P.2d 1246, 1250 (1984). See also Daly Ditches Irrigation Dist. v. National Sur. Corp.,
234 Mont. 537, 542, 764 P.2d 1276, 1279 (1988) (holding no duty to defend employer for
intentional act of wrongful discharge).
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IV. MONTANA CASE LAW
The Montana Supreme Court has yet to rule on any of the
major environmental liability coverage issues. General Insurance
Co. v. Town Pump, Inc. 3 4 suggests the possible direction of the
court. Town Pump's underground petroleum tanks leaked for two
years before discovery. The insurer conceded, and the court found,
that coverage applied in spite of the standard pollution exclusion
because the pollution was "sudden, unexpected and uninten-
tional."'' 6 General Insurance initially defended Town Pump under
a reservation of rights agreement.'36 The insurer then sought a de-
claratory judgment in state district court, contending that the CGL
policy did not cover the gas leak because leakage was not "sud-
den." '3 7 The lower court held that leakage was "sudden, unex-
pected and unintentional 'as far as Town Pump was concerned'"
and apportioned liability equally between General Insurance and
Town Pump. 38 The insurer was liable for the first year of the leak;
Town Pump was negligent in failing to discover the leak during the
second year. 39 On appeal, General Insurance changed its position
and conceded that the pollution exclusion clause did not apply to
the leak.14  The Montana Supreme Court awarded Town Pump
full coverage for both years of the leak, reasoning that, although
Town Pump was negligent in failing to discover the leak, "[m]ere
negligence will not defeat recovery on an insurance policy.''
In a 1990 Montana Federal District Court case, the court ruled
that an insurer acted in good faith in denying coverage for a tank
leak because the denial was based on an absolute pollution exclu-
sion in the insured's policy. 2 The insurance carrier was equitably
estopped, however, from relying on the new policy containing the
absolute pollution exclusion because the carrier failed to disclose
the exclusion change to the insured upon issuing the new policy." 3
134. 214 Mont. 27, 692 P.2d 427 (1984).
135. Id. at 31, 692 P.2d at 429-30.
136. Id. at 29, 692 P.2d at 429.
137. Id. at 30, 692 P.2d at 429.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 31, 692 P.2d at 429.
141. Id. at 34, 692 P.2d at 431.
142. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Quisel, 7 Mont. Fed. Rep. 483 (D. Mont.
November 5, 1990).
143. Id. at 500. The federal court certified to the Montana Supreme Court the cover-
age question under the standard pollution exclusion clause. The case settled, however, prior
to the supreme court hearing.
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V. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Apart from the contract interpretation questions, the Montana
Supreme Court will face public policy considerations in ruling on
the coverage issue. As one state court noted:
The policy reasons for the pollution exclusion are obvious: if an
insured knows that liability incurred by all manner of negligent
or careless spills and releases is covered by his liability policy, he
is tempted to diminish his precautions and relax his vigilance.
[Plutting the financial responsibility for pollution .. .upon the
insured places the responsibility to guard against such occur-
rences upon the party with the most control over the circum-
stances and most likely to cause the pollution. 4
Under this argument, the CGL policy should exclude coverage
for quasi-intentional acts, such as damages from pollution which
are a natural byproduct of an intentional activity, just as the policy
excludes coverage for intentional acts such as assault and battery.
Gradual pollution from a business activity is discoverable and,
once discovered, "its continuation is certainly expected, and in
some sense, 'intended.' "14 Releasing businesses from what are es-
sentially "predictable costs of doing business" discourages safe
practices.14 Businesses should be encouraged to take an active role
in monitoring for gradual pollution and to take action to remedy
existing pollution.
Nationally, courts have construed CERCLA liability broadly,
placing the burden of cleanup on those who benefitted from the
property. 47 Broader liability "creates incentives for safer practices;
and it encourages defendants to locate and implead other responsi-
ble parties. 1 48 Providing insurance coverage for industrial pollu-
tion (from which the insured profited) defeats the incentive. In
fact, for this reason New York State enacted legislation twenty
years ago which prohibited insurance coverage for any pollution
damage.1
49
However, this argument urging strict interpretation for "in-
144. Waste Management of the Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 340 S.E.2d 374, 381
(N.C. 1986). See Adler & Broiles, supra note 30, at 1260-61.
145. Abraham, supra note 29, at 953.
146. Abraham, supra note 29, at 953.
147. See generally Allen Kezsbom et al., "Successor" and "Parent" Liability for
Superfund Cleanup Costs: The Evolving State of the Law, 10 VA. ENVTL. LJ. 45 (1990).
148. Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 725 F. Supp. 1446, 1459 (W.D. Mich. 1988).
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centive" reasons may be nullified by the current absolute pollution
exclusion. Under the absolute exclusion, insureds are virtually
guaranteed that they, and not their insurers, will be liable for pol-
lution damages. Therefore, the incentive for responsible behavior is
now in place. Judicial interpretation of prior policies will not affect
future landowner behavior.
There are additional competing public policy concerns which
conflict with the "incentive" argument. The first concern involves
protecting the interests of the insured. Insurance law jurisprudence
traditionally favors the insured in order to protect against the
larger insurer responsible for drafting the policy. Second is the
"deep pockets" argument which states that someone must pay for
environmental cleanup costs, be it the property owner, the insur-
ance carrier, or the taxpayer. The costs of restoring contaminated
property can be enormous, and occasionally may exceed the re-
sources of the property owner or operator. In those cases, if the
courts do not find the insurance carrier liable and the PRP be-
comes insolvent, the burden will fall on the government and tax-
payers. Who should bare the burden?
VI. CONCLUSION
Montana is on the verge of entering the CERCLA-related liti-
gation explosion which is sweeping the country. This litigation in-
volves complex issues and has produced a wide variety of judicial
opinions and scholarly commentary. CERCLA liability is broad
and continues to expand under judicial interpretation. The Mon-
tana bench and bar should prepare to address the increasingly
complex insurance coverage issues in environmental liability
litigation.
Both insurance contract interpretation and environmental pol-
icy questions loom ahead. The court most likely will find the fol-
lowing: unexpected property damage from pollution satisfies the
definition of "occurrence"; that an insurance policy not containing
a pollution exclusion clause will cover such damages; that cleanup
costs are "damages" under the CGL policy; and that the "abso-
lute" pollution exclusion is unambiguous and clearly excludes all
pollution-related damages. The court, however, should carefully
consider its interpretation of the standard pollution exclusion
when the pollution arises as a natural byproduct of industrial ac-
tivity. The standard pollution exclusion covers only "sudden and
accidental" pollution damage. Arguably, insurers and insureds did
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Finally, the court will be bound by contract interpretation
principles, but it is also likely to consider both the congressional
intent underlying CERCLA's severe liability provisions and the
public policy implications surrounding the pollution exclusion in-
terpretation issues. Congress intended CERCLA to place the bur-
den of cleanup on the parties who caused the pollution or benefit-
ted from the property. CERCLA's strict liability should encourage
property owners to remedy existing pollution and avoid future pol-
luting practices. The absolute pollution exclusion is consistent with
this goal and therefore, will likely be upheld. The standard pollu-
tion exclusion, however, presents the court with a more difficult
task.
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